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Abstract
In recent years there has been growing interest in study of multi-antenna transmit designs for
providing secure communication over the physical layer. This paper considers the scenario of an intended
multi-input single-output channel overheard by multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers. Specifically, we
address the transmit covariance optimization for secrecy-rate maximization (SRM) of that scenario. The
challenge of this problem is that it is a nonconvex optimization problem. This paper shows that the SRM
problem can actually be solved in a convex and tractable fashion, by recasting the SRM problem as a
semidefinite program (SDP). The SRM problem we solve is under the premise of perfect channel state
information (CSI). This paper also deals with the imperfect CSI case. We consider a worst-case robust
SRM formulation under spherical CSI uncertainties, and we develop an optimal solution to it, again via
SDP. Moreover, our analysis reveals that transmit beamforming is generally the optimal transmit strategy
for SRM of the considered scenario, for both the perfect and imperfect CSI cases. Simulation results
are provided to illustrate the secrecy-rate performance gains of the proposed SDP solutions compared to
some suboptimal transmit designs.
Index terms− Physical-layer secrecy, secrecy capacity, transmit beamforming, semidefinite program.
EDICS: MSP-CODR (MIMO precoder/decoder design), MSP-APPL (Applications of MIMO communi-
cations and signal processing), SAM-BEAM (Applications of sensor and array multichannel processing)
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer secrecy is an information theoretic approach where we intend to provide a legitimate
receiver with a reliable communication, and, at the same time, make sure that illegitimate receivers can
retrieve almost nothing about the transmitted information from the signals they have intercepted. The
study of this topic is meaningful and important, enabling us to understand the information rate limits
when perfect secrecy is desired; i.e., the secrecy capacity or the maximum secrecy rate. Moreover, the
physical-layer secrecy study provides us with vital implications on how physical-layer secret transmit
schemes should be designed in practice. While the concepts of physical-layer secrecy can be found back
in the 70’s; e.g., the seminal works by Wyner [1], Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [2], and Csisz´ar and
Ko¨rner [3], this topic has attracted much interest in recent years, in both information theory [4]–[11]
and signal processing [12]–[23]. We can see at least two reasons for this. First, the rapid advances of
wireless system architectures and applications, such as those for wireless networks, have given rise to
new issues regarding information security. In particular, the open nature of the wireless medium means
that signal interception may be easily conducted by eavesdroppers. Cryptographic encryption, the class of
techniques commonly used to provide information security, is expected to be faced with more challenges;
for instance, in key distribution and management [24], [25]. Physical-layer secrecy suggests a physical-
layer-based alternative to attacking the security problem, which is meaningful and may complement
the network-layer-based cryptographic encryption techniques. Second, multi-input multi-output (MIMO)
techniques provide physical-layer secrecy with new and exciting opportunities. Intuitively, if we know
the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdroppers to a certain extent (say, in scenarios where the
eavesdroppers are users of the system, who attempt to access unauthorized services), then we may utilize
the MIMO degree of freedom to weaken these eavesdroppers’ receptions. Another idea that is possible
only with MIMO is that of interfering eavesdroppers through artificially generated spatial noise; see [14]
for the original work and [12], [15], [17], [18], [23] for some recent developments.
In fact, we have recently seen a growing body of physical-layer secrecy literatures that deal with various
MIMO scenarios. For the scenario of an MIMO channel overheard by one multi-antenna eavesdropper,
the secrecy capacity has been considered in [5]–[8], [26]. The MISO counterpart has also caught some
attention; see [4], [11]. We should note that there is a difference between the above described MIMO and
MISO scenarios, from a viewpoint of transmit optimization. Specifically, we are interested in transmit
covariance designs for achieving the maximum secrecy rate. This secrecy-rate maximization (SRM)
problem is nonconvex, and solving it under the general MIMO scenario is a challenging issue; see
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3[19], [21] for some recent endeavors. One exception where the SRM problem is found to be tractable is
the MISO scenario — its optimal transmit design is shown to admit a closed-form solution, involving a
generalized eigenvalue problem [4].
This paper considers the scenario of an MISO channel overheard by multiple multi-antenna eavesdrop-
pers. This scenario would happen, say, for example, in a downlink environment where the intended receiver
uses one antenna for low operational costs and the eavesdroppers are users of the same network employing
sophisticated multi-antenna hardware to improve their interceptions. The SRM problem for this particular
scenario has been formulated in [10]. The problem is again nonconvex, and, to our knowledge, an efficient
optimal transmit solution to it has not been available in general. We should mention that for the special
case of one-antenna eavesdroppers, an optimal SRM design has been proposed in [16]; the idea there is to
establish a relationship between the SRM problem and a cognitive radio (CR) design problem under the
one-antenna eavesdroppers/secondary-users context. That secrecy-CR relationship result is applicable also
to MIMO intended channel. For the multiple-antenna eavesdroppers case, the secrecy-CR relationship
result does not apply and it is used as an approximation to the SRM problem [16]. This paper shows that
the considered SRM problem can actually be solved in a convex and tractable fashion; specifically, we turn
the SRM problem to a semidefinite program (SDP), a representative convex optimization problem whose
globally optimal solution can be obtained efficiently by available algorithms [27], [28]. The proposed
approach is indirect, and it may remind us of study of some kind of dual problems1 in the context
of multiuser downlink transmit beamforming [29], [30]; also [31], [32] for multiuser downlink OFDM.
In particular, we need to consider another secrecy-rate formulation, namely, a secrecy-rate constrained
problem, and use the results established there to prove that the SRM problem has an SDP equivalent.
Another key contribution of this work is that we extend our SRM results to the imperfect CSI
case. The eavesdroppers’ CSIs may be estimated depending on the application environment; e.g., when
the eavesdroppers are also system users, however we may only have some inaccurate, possibly rough,
knowledge about those CSIs. The CSI of the intended receiver may also be subject to some uncertainties;
e.g., those caused by channel estimation errors and/or quantization errors, though such an issue should
be less severe than that for the eavesdroppers. We should note that physical-layer secrecy with imperfect
CSI or no CSI has started to catch attention very recently; see, e.g., [4], [15], [18], [22], [33]. Here,
we consider a robust SRM formulation of our considered scenario, where we employ a spherical CSI
1The dual problem relationship we refer to is that of the quality-of-service (QoS) constrained power minimization problem
and the power constrained QoS maximization problem [29].
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4uncertainty model and the uncertainties are handled in a worst-case sense. The proposed robust SRM
formulation is a conservative design— it guarantees perfect secrecy for any admissible CSI uncertainties,
including the worst. The robust SRM formulation exhibits a more complex structure than its non-robust
counterpart. Fortunately, it is shown that the robust SRM problem can be equivalently represented, and
solved, by an SDP; in addition to the approach used in non-robust SRM, the idea is to employ linear
matrix inequality characterization to handle the imperfect-CSI induced constraints in a tractable way.
In establishing our optimal SDP solutions to the SRM problems, we obtain a physical result that agrees
well with intuitive expectation — transmit beamforming is generally the SRM optimal transmit strategy of
the considered scenario, for both the perfect and imperfect CSI cases. While this result is already known
for the one multi-antenna eavesdropper case [4] and the multiple one-antenna eavesdroppers case [16]
(both with perfect CSI), the result here is more general.
This paper is organized as follows. A background review and problem statement is given in Section II.
Section III considers the SRM problem for the MISO, multi-eavesdropper scenario with perfect CSI,
and establishes an SDP solution to it. Section IV extends the SRM results to the imperfect CSI case.
Simulation results comparing the proposed SRM solutions and some other suboptimal secrecy transmit
designs are illustrated in SectionV. Section VI gives the conclusion and discussion.
Our notations are as follows. We will use boldface capital letters to denote matrices, boldface lower case
letters to denote vectors; AT , AH , A†, Tr(A) and det(A) represent transpose, Hermitian (conjugate)
transpose, pseudo inverse, trace and determinant of a matrix A; I denotes an identity matrix; ‖ · ‖F
represents the Frobenius norm of a matrix; rank(A) is the rank of matrix A; A  0 (A ≻ 0) means A
is a Hermitian positive semidefinite (definite) matrix; R+ denotes the set of all nonnegative real numbers;
HN denotes the set of all N -by-N Hermitian matrices; HN+ denotes the set of all N -by-N Hermitian
positive semidefinite matrices; CM×N represents an M -by-N dimensional complex matrix set; A ⊗ B
denotes the Kronecker product of A and B; vec(A) denotes the vectorization of matrix A by stacking
its columns; E{·} is the expectation operator.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we review some basic concepts of physical-layer secrecy with an emphasis on the MISO
scenarios, and provide the problem statement of our interested scenario.
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5A. One Eavesdropper Case: A Review
The endeavor of this subsection is to give some intuitive insights into physical-layer secrecy, by
reviewing the scenario of a MISO channel overheard by one eavesdropper (also known as the MISOME
wiretap channel in the literature [4]). Fig. 1(a) shows the scenario. In this configuration, the transmitter
is equipped with multiple antennas, intending to deliver information to the legitimate receiver which uses
one antenna. One eavesdropper is present, and it uses multiple antennas to intercept the transmission.
Following the convention in the secrecy capacity literature, we call the transmitter, the legitimate receiver,
and the eavesdropper as Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The signal models for the Alice-to-Bob and
Alice-to-Eve links are, respectively,
yb(t) = h
Hx(t) + n(t), (1a)
ye(t) = G
Hx(t) + v(t). (1b)
Here, x(t) ∈ CNt is the transmit vector by Alice, with Nt being the number of transmit antennas; h ∈ CNt
represents the MISO Alice-to-Bob channel; G ∈ CNt×Ne represents the MIMO Alice-to-Eve channel,
with Ne being the number of receive antennas at Eve; and n(t) ∈ C, v(t) ∈ CNe are zero-mean additive
white Gaussian noises. Without loss of generality, we assume unit variance of all the noise terms; i.e.,
E{|n(t)|2} = 1, E{v(t)vH (t)} = I.
x
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Fig. 1. System model. (a) One multi-antenna eavesdropper; (b) Multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers.
The problem of interest here is to prevent Eve from retrieving useful information via appropriate
transmit designs, and this can be addressed by using the notion of physical-layer secrecy [34]. To describe
this, let us denote the transmit covariance by
W = E{x(t)xH(t)}.
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6According to [4], the transmit covariance design that provides the maximum secrecy rate for the system
model (1) is given by
R⋆(P ) = max
W
log(1 + hHWh)− log det(I+GHWG)
s.t. W  0, Tr(W) ≤ P,
(2)
where P is a given average transmit power limit, and R⋆(P ) is defined to be the optimal secrecy
rate (in bps/Hz) for a given P . As seen in (2), the problem is to maximize the mutual information
difference between the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve channels. The subsequent optimized rate R⋆(P )
is achievable— from an information theoretic perspective, there exist codes such that Bob can obtain a
perfectly secure message from Alice at a rate of R⋆(P ) bps/Hz, while Eve can retrieve almost nothing
about the message [3]. It has also been shown that (2) is the secrecy capacity for the one-Eve model
in (1).
The secrecy-rate maximization problem in (2) has a closed-form solution. Let q be the unit-norm
principal generalized eigenvector of (I+PhhH , I+PGGH). The optimal transmit design of (2), denoted
herein by W⋆, can be shown to be [4]
W⋆ =


PqqH , f(PqqH) > 0
0, f(PqqH) ≤ 0
(3)
where f(W) = log(1 + hHWh) − log det(I +GHWG) denotes the secrecy rate of a given W. The
structure of W⋆ shown above reveals two physical results: First, the optimal transmit strategy for the
case of R⋆(P ) > 0 (positive secrecy rate) is to employ a rank-one transmit structure; i.e., transmit
beamforming. Second, the optimal transmit design for the (trivial) case of R⋆(P ) = 0 is to shut down
the transmitter.
B. Multi-Eavesdropper Case
This paper focuses on the scenario of MISO Alice-to-Bob link and multiple MIMO Alice-to-Eves
links; such a configuration is depicted in Fig. 1(b). For this scenario the system model is modified to
yb(t) = h
Hx(t) + n(t), (4a)
ye,k(t) = G
H
k x(t) + vk(t), k = 1, . . . ,K, (4b)
where the Alice-to-Bob channel model in (4a) is identical to that in (1a); ye,k(t) is the received signal at
the kth Eve;Gk ∈ CNt×Ne,k is the MIMO channel from Alice to the kth Eve;Ne,k is the number of receive
antennas of the kth Eve; vk(t) is additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and E{vk(t)vk(t)H} = I;
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7K is the number of Eves. An achievable secrecy rate for the multiple-Eve model (4) has been derived
in [10] and is given by
R⋆(P ) = max
W
min
k=1,...,K
fk(W)
s.t. W  0, Tr(W) ≤ P
(5)
where
fk(W) = log(1 + h
HWh)− log det(I+GHk WGk) (6)
is the secrecy rate function corresponding to the kth Eve. The goal of (5) is to maximize the worst
secrecy rate (or mutual information difference) among all the Eves.
The secrecy-rate maximization (SRM) problem (5) presents a challenge from the standpoint of transmit
covariance optimization. Problem (5) is a nonconvex problem, due to the nonconcave, Eve-induced terms
− log det(I+GHk WGk). While this nonconvex SRM problem admits a closed-form solution in the one-
Eve case (as mentioned above), it is not known if the SRM problem can also be solved in closed form
for the general multi-Eve case.
We should mention a transmit design that has a closed-form solution but is generally suboptimal in
the SRM context, namely, projected maximum-ratio transmission (projected-MRT). The idea is to apply
nulling on all Eves; i.e., to enforce GHk W = 0 for all k. Let G = [ G1, . . . ,GK ] be the aggregate
channel matrix of all Eves, and Π⊥
G
= I −G(GHG)†GH be the orthogonal complement projector of
G. The transmit beamformer weight in projected-MRT is
w =
√
P
‖Π⊥
G
h‖2
Π⊥Gh,
or, in other words, we choose W = wwH . The advantage of projected-MRT lies in its simplicity, but
its downside is that we may not have the degree of freedom to perform nulling when the total number
of antennas of Eves,
∑K
k=1Ne,k, reaches or exceeds the number of transmit antennas Nt.
In what follows, we will describe our approach to solving the SRM problem (5).
III. AN SDP APPROACH TO THE SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
The focus of this section is on solving Problem (5), the secrecy-rate maximization of an MISO channel
eavesdropped by multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers. We will show how the SRM problem (5), which
is nonconvex, can actually be solved by an equivalent SDP problem that is convex and tractable.
The idea behind the proposed SDP solution is to consider some form of convex approximation to the
SRM (5), and then to prove that that approximate SRM problem is indeed tight. The latter part is not
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8straightforward. We will need to study a variation of SRM, given as follows:
P ⋆(R) = min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. min
k=1,...,K
fk(W) ≥ R.
(7)
The design in (7) seeks to satisfy a minimum secrecy rate specification R (which is given) and to
minimize the average power. The reason for considering the secrecy-rate constrained (SRC) problem (7)
is that it is relatively easier to analyze than the SRM (5). And, as a side advantage, the SRC design
itself is interesting and practically meaningful. We will develop some key results for Problem (7), e.g.,
that (7) has an SDP equivalent. We will then establish a link between the SRC problem (7) and the SRM
problem (5), thereby allowing us to use the proven results in SRC to show that SRM can be exactly
solved by an SDP.
The first and second subsections describe our developments for the SRC and SRM problems, respec-
tively.
A. The Secrecy-Rate Constrained Problem
To study the SRC problem (7), let us express (7) in a more explicit form:
P ⋆(R) = min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. 2−R ≥ max
k=1,...,K
det(I+GHk WGk)
1 + hHWh
.
(8)
Problem (8) is nonconvex, due to the determinant functions in the constraint of (8). Consider the following
lemma which we will use to provide a convex approximation to (8):
Lemma 1 Let A  0. It holds true that
det(I+A) ≥ 1 + Tr(A), (9)
and that the equality in (9) holds if and only if rank(A) ≤ 1.
Proof: Let r = rank(A). The case of r = 0 is trivial. For r ≥ 1, let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λr > 0 denote
the non-zero eigenvalues of A. We have that
det(I+A) =
∏r
i=1(1 + λi) = 1 +
∑r
i=1 λi +
∑
i 6=k λiλk + . . .
≥ 1 +∑ri=1 λi = 1 + Tr(A)
and it can be seen that the equality above holds if and only if r = 1. 
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9Applying Lemma 1 to Problem (8), we obtain a relaxation of (8) as follows:
P ⋆(R) ≥ P ⋆relax(R) = min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. 2−R ≥ max
k=1,...,K
1 + Tr(GHk WGk)
1 + hHWh
.
(10)
Problem (10) is a convex problem. Specifically, (10) can be formulated as an SDP
P ⋆relax(R) = min
W
Tr(W)
s.t. W  0,
1 + Tr(hhHW) ≥ 2R(1 + Tr(GkGHk W)),
k = 1, . . . ,K,
(11)
whose globally optimal solution can be efficiently found by available solvers [27], [28]. While our
original motivation is to approximate the SRC problem (8) by the convex relaxation (10), Lemma 1
provides an important hint regarding the tightness of the relaxation: The relaxation (10) is tight (which
means P ⋆(R) = P ⋆relax(R)) when the optimal solution of (10) is of rank one. We prove the following
key result:
Proposition 1 Consider the relaxed SRC problem (10) for the case where the secrecy-rate specification
R is positive2, or simply R > 0. Also, suppose that Problem (10) is feasible. Then, the optimal solution
of (10) must be of rank one and unique.
The proof, which can be found in Appendix A, is based on examination of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions of the SDP (11).
Using Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we reach the conclusion that
Corollary 1 Consider the SRC problem (8) for the case R > 0, and suppose that Problem (8) is feasible.
The relaxed SRC problem (10) [or the SDP (11)] exactly solves the SRC problem, in the sense that the
optimal solution of (10) is also that of (8), and vice versa. Moreover, the optimal SRC solution is unique
and of rank one.
Proof: Let Wˆ be the optimal solution of (10), which is unique and of rank one by Proposition 1. By
Lemma 1, Wˆ is feasible to (8), which implies that P ⋆relax(R) = Tr(Wˆ) ≥ P ⋆(R). Since we also have
P ⋆(R) ≥ P ⋆relax(R) [cf., Eqn. (10)], we conclude that P ⋆relax(R) = P ⋆(R); i.e., Wˆ is optimal to (8).
2The case of R = 0 is trivial since W = 0 can easily be verified to be the corresponding optimal solution of (10).
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On the other hand, let W⋆ be an optimal solution of (8). Owing to Lemma 1, W⋆ is feasible to (10).
The result P ⋆relax(R) = P ⋆(R) = Tr(W⋆) further implies that W⋆ is optimal to (10), too. By Proposition
1, W⋆ has to be unique and of rank one. 
We have developed an SDP solution to the SRC problem (8). Moreover, the unique rank-one nature
of the SRC solution, as indicated in Corollary 1, suggests that transmit beamforming is generally the
optimal transmit strategy for the SRC problem (8).
B. The Secrecy-Rate Maximization Problem
We now turn our attention to the SRM problem (5). For convenience, we rewrite Problem (5) as
γ⋆(P ) = min
W0
Tr(W)≤P
max
k=1,...,K
det(I +GHk WGk)
1 + hHWh
(12)
where 0 < γ⋆(P ) ≤ 1 is related to the optimal secrecy rate through the relation R⋆(P ) = log(1/γ⋆(P )).
Following the same spirit as in the preceding subsection, we apply Lemma 1 to (12) to obtain a relaxation:
γ⋆(P ) ≥ γ⋆relax(P ) = min
W0
Tr(W)≤P
max
k=1,...,K
1 + Tr(GHk WGk)
1 + hHWh
. (13)
The relaxation above is a quasi-convex problem, whose globally optimal solution can be searched by
general techniques for quasi-convex optimization (e.g., bisection [35]). We however will propose a more
efficient method of solving (13); namely, via SDP, after we study the tightness of the relaxation in (13).
Our key question here is whether Problem (13) yields a rank-one solution: If it does, then the
relaxation (13) is tight (γ⋆(P ) = γ⋆relax(P )) by Lemma 1. Our insight to this is as follows: Suppose that
γ⋆relax(P ) in (13) has been computed. We consider the following relaxed SRC problem
min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. γ⋆relax(P ) ≥ maxk=1,...,K
1 + Tr(GHk WGk)
1 + hHWh
,
(14)
where we fix the secrecy rate specification at R = log(1/γ⋆relax(P )). By Proposition 1, we know that
Problem (14) has a unique rank-one solution (in the nontrivial case). If the optimal solution of (14) can
be proven to be an optimal solution of (13) as well, then we will be able to infer immediately that the
relaxation (13) is tight. With this idea in mind, we give a formal proof in Appendix B and show that
April 19, 2011 DRAFT
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Theorem 1 Consider the SRM problem (12) for the case of 0 < γ⋆(P ) < 1. The relaxed SRM
problem (13) exactly solves the SRM problem, in the sense that the optimal solution of (13) is also
that of (12), and vice versa. Moreover, the optimal SRM solution is unique and of rank one3.
The remaining issue is to solve the equivalent SRM problem (13). Problem (13) can be solved by
using a bisection search methodology commonly used in quasi-convex optimization. However, such a
method would require solving a sequence of (usually many) SDPs. Here we propose a more efficient
alternative where we exploit the problem structures and recast (13) as an SDP. The idea is to use the
Charnes-Cooper transformation [36], [37]. Let us consider the following transformation of the transmit
covariance:
W = Z/ξ
for some Z  0, ξ > 0. The change of variables above enables us to re-express (13) as
min
Z,ξ
max
k=1,...,K
ξ +Tr(GkG
H
k Z)
ξ +Tr(hhHZ)
(15a)
s.t. Tr(Z) ≤ ξP, (15b)
Z  0, ξ > 0, (15c)
which may further be reformulated as an SDP
min
Z,ξ,τ
τ (16a)
s.t. ξ +Tr(GkG
H
k Z) ≤ τ, k = 1, . . . ,K, (16b)
ξ +Tr(hhHZ) = 1, (16c)
Tr(Z) ≤ ξP, (16d)
Z  0, ξ ≥ 0. (16e)
Note that (16a)-(16b) is a consequence of the standard epigraph reformulation (see the literature, e.g., [35]),
and the constraint (16c) is additionally introduced to fix the denominator of the objective function in (15a)
which is without loss of generality. The relatively more crucial part with the reformulation lies in replacing
ξ > 0 in (15c) by ξ ≥ 0 in (16e). We show that this will not cause a problem:
3The case of γ⋆(P ) = 1 is trivial because that corresponds to zero secrecy rate and the respective SRM solution is simply
W = 0.
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Proposition 2 The SDP (16) is equivalent to Problem (15). The former is also equivalent to the SRM
problem (12) through the relation W = Z/ξ.
Proof: The remaining, nontrivial part is when ξ = 0 in (16e). Suppose that this is true. Then, by (16d)
and Z  0, we must have Z = 0. The constraint (16c) is then violated as a consequence. Thus, a feasible
point of (16) must not have ξ = 0. This prove that Problem (16) is equivalent to Problem (15). The
solution equivalence of Problems (15) and (12) through W = Z/ξ follows from the discussion above
and Theorem 1. 
Concluding, we have shown that the SRM problem (12) can essentially be solved by using SDP; see
Theorem 1 and Proposition 2. Moreover, Theorem 1 reveals that the SRM solution must be of rank one,
which implies that transmit beamforming is generally the optimal transmit strategy for the SRM problem.
IV. SECRECY-RATE OPTIMIZATION WITH IMPERFECT CSI
The MISO secrecy problems solved in the previous sections have been based on a premise that the
CSIs of Bob and Eves are perfectly known to Alice. In this section, we extend our results to the imperfect
CSI case. We will consider robust MISO secrecy-rate formulations that cater for CSI uncertainties in the
worst-case sense. The proposed robust secrecy-rate problems are more complex in structures and more
challenging to solve than their perfect-CSI counterparts, but we will show that these problems can still be
turned to SDPs. The robust formulations will be presented in the first subsection, while the SDP solutions
to the robust formulations will be described in the second and third subsections.
A. Robust Secrecy-Rate Problem Formulations
Our model assumption for imperfect CSI is based on the deterministic model [38]–[40]. We model the
Alice-to-Bob channel and the Alice-to-Eve channels respectively by
h = h¯+∆h,
Gk = G¯k +∆Gk, k = 1, . . . ,K.
Here, h¯ and G¯k are the channel means and they are known to Alice; ∆h and ∆Gk represent the
channel uncertainties. These uncertainties are assumed to be deterministic unknowns with bounds on
their magnitudes:
‖∆h‖2 = ‖h− h¯‖2 ≤ εb,
‖∆Gk‖F = ‖Gk − G¯k‖F ≤ εe,k, k = 1, . . . ,K,
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for some εb, εe,1, . . . , εe,K > 0.
The proposed robust SRM formulation is as follows:
R⋆(P ) = max
W0,
Tr(W)≤P
ψ(W) (17)
where ψ(W) is the worst-case secrecy rate function, defined by
ψ(W) = min
k=1,...,K
ψk(W), (18)
ψk(W) = min
h∈Bb,
Gk∈Be,k
log(1 + hHWh)− log det(I+GHk WGk), (19)
Bb = { h ∈ CNt | ‖h− h¯‖2 ≤ εb }, (20)
Be,k = { Gk ∈ CNt×Ne,k | ‖Gk − G¯k‖F ≤ εe,k }. (21)
The function ψk(·) represents the worst secrecy-rate function among all channel possibilities, for the
kth Eve. The resulting design (17) is a conservative one; from its formulation we see that the secrecy
rate will be guaranteed to be no less than the worst-case optimum R⋆(P ) for any channel possibilities
(described by Bb, Be,k).
Based on the same philosophy as in the last section, we can also formulate a worst-case robust SRC
design:
P ⋆(R) = min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. ψ(W) ≥ R,
(22)
i.e., minimizing the transmit power while satisfying a secrecy rate specification R in the worst-case sense.
This robust SRC problem is interesting in its own rights, and, like the perfect-CSI solution established in
the last section, solving the robust SRC problem will provide us with a crucial key to solving the robust
SRM problem.
B. The Robust Secrecy-Rate Constrained Problem
We consider the robust SRC (R-SRC) problem (22) in this subsection, where we aim to develop an
SDP solution to R-SRC optimization. From (18)-(22), Problem (22) can be expressed as
P ⋆(R) = min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. 2−R ≥
max
Gk∈Be,k
det(I +GHk WGk)
min
h∈Bb
1 + hHWh
,
k = 1, . . . ,K.
(23)
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Our approach to solving (23) is somehow reminiscent of its non-robust counterpart in Section III-A. We
use Lemma 1 to relax the constraints in (23), and obtain the following relaxed problem:
P ⋆(R) ≥ P ⋆relax(R) = min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. 2−R ≥
max
Gk∈Be,k
1 + Tr(GHk WGk)
min
h∈Bb
1 + hHWh
,
k = 1, . . . ,K.
(24)
Our goals are then to turn (24) to a tractable convex problem, and to show that the relaxation in (24) is
tight by proving the rank-one solution structure of (24).
In fact, the relaxed R-SRC problem (24) can be recast as an SDP. To do so, the first step is to
reformulate (24) as
min
W0,θ
Tr(W) (25a)
s.t. min
h∈Bb
1 + hHWh ≥ θ, (25b)
2−Rθ ≥ max
Gk∈Be,k
1 + Tr(GHk WGk), (25c)
k = 1, . . . ,K,
where we have added a slack variable θ to decouple the fractional functions in the original constraints
in (24). Problem (25) is already a convex problem in principle, but with semi-infinite constraints as seen
in (25b) and (25c). To make the problem more tractable to solve and analyze, the second step is to
turn (25b) and (25c) to linear matrix inequalities (LMIs), using the S-procedure:
Lemma 2 ( S-procedure [35] ) Let
fk(x) = x
HAkx+ 2Re{bHk x}+ ck
for k = 1, 2, where Ak ∈ Hn, bk ∈ Cn, ck ∈ R. The implication f1(x) ≤ 0 ⇒ f2(x) ≤ 0 holds if and
only if there exists µ ≥ 0 such that
µ

A1 b1
bH1 c1

−

A2 b2
bH2 c2

  0,
provided that there exists a point xˆ such that f1(xˆ) < 0.
To apply the S-procedure to the constraint (25b), we substitute the representation h = h¯+∆h into (25b)
and re-express (25b) as:
∆hH∆h ≤ ε2b =⇒ ∆hHW∆h+ 2Re{h¯HW∆h}+ h¯HWh¯+ 1− θ ≥ 0. (26)
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Using the S-procedure, we transform (26) to an LMI
Tb(W, λb, θ) ,

λbINt +W Wh¯
h¯HW −λbε2b − θ + h¯HWh¯+ 1

  0, (27)
for some λb ≥ 0. Similarly, (25c) is equivalent to the following implication:
∆gHk ∆gk ≤ ε2e,k =⇒ ∆gHk Wk∆gk + 2Re{g¯Hk Wk∆gk}+ g¯Hk Wkg¯k + 1− 2−Rθ ≤ 0, (28)
where Wk = INe,k ⊗W and g¯k = vec(G¯k). By the S-procedure, the above implication can be re-
expressed as the following LMI:
Te,k(W, λe,k, θ) ,

λe,kINe,kNt −Wk −Wkg¯k
−g¯Hk Wk −λe,kε2e,k − g¯Hk Wkg¯k + 2−Rθ − 1

  0, (29)
for some λe,k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K. Substituting (27) and (29) back into (25), we obtain the following
SDP
P ⋆relax(R) = min
W,θ,λb,λe
Tr(W) (30a)
s.t. Tb(W, λb, θ)  0, (30b)
Te,k(W, λe,k, θ)  0, k = 1, . . . ,K, (30c)
W  0, λb ≥ 0, λe,k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K. (30d)
where λe = [ λe,1, . . . , λe,K ]T . The SDP (30), as an equivalent form of the relaxed R-SRC problem,
can be solved conveniently by available SDP solvers. In addition to this, the problem structures of (30)
enable us to analyze the solution optimality of the relaxed R-SRC problem via the KKT conditions:
Proposition 3 Consider the relaxed R-SRC problem (30) for the case of R > 0, Also, suppose that
Problem (30) is feasible. Then, the optimal solution of (30) must be of rank one and unique.
It is interesting to note that the end results of Proposition 3 are exactly the same as those of its non-
robust counterpart, Proposition 1. However, to prove Proposition 3 is considerably more complicated,
owing to the more complex LMIs in (30b) and (30c). The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix
C.
We complete this subsection by using Proposition 3 to verify that the relaxed R-SRC problem (30) is
tight:
Corollary 2 Consider the R-SRC problem (23) for the case of R > 0, and suppose that problem (23)
is feasible. The relaxed R-SRC problem (30) exactly solves the R-SRC problem, in the sense that the
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optimal solutions of (23) and (30) are equivalent to one another. Moreover, the optimal R-SRC solution
is unique and of rank one.
Proof: The proof is essentially identical to that of Corollary 1, and thus is omitted for brevity. 
C. The Robust Secrecy-Rate Maximization Problem
With the R-SRC results established in the previous subsection, we are now ready to develop an SDP
solution to the robust SRM (R-SRM) problem (17). Problem (17) can be expressed as
γ⋆(P ) = min
W0,
Tr(W)≤P
max
k=1,...,K
max
Gk∈Be,k
det(I +GHk WGk)
min
h∈Bb
1 + hHWh
(31)
where 0 < γ⋆(P ) ≤ 1. Applying Lemma 1 to (31) yields the following relaxed R-SRM problem
γ⋆(P ) ≥ γ⋆relax(P ) = min
W0,
Tr(W)≤P
max
k=1,...,K
max
Gk∈Be,k
1 + Tr(GHk WGk)
min
h∈Bb
1 + hHWh
. (32)
We again investigate two issues: the tightness of the relaxed R-SRM problem, and the possibility of
converting (32) to a convex problem.
The relaxed R-SRM problem is tight. We show the following:
Theorem 2 Consider the R-SRM problem (31) for the case of 0 < γ⋆(P ) < 1. The relaxed R-SRM
problem (32) exactly solves the R-SRM problem, in the sense that the optimal solutions of (31) and (32)
are equivalent to one another. Moreover, the optimal R-SRM solution is unique and of rank one.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2 is essentially the same as that of its non-robust counterpart, Theorem 1,
and here we provide only the outline. The idea is to consider the relaxed R-SRC problem
min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. γ⋆relax(P ) ≥
max
Gk∈Be,k
1 + Tr(GHk WGk)
min
h∈Bb
1 + hHWh
,
k = 1, . . . ,K.
(33)
It is shown that the optimal solutions of (32) and (33) are equivalent to one another, by following the
same procedure as in Appendix B. The solution equivalence of (32) and (33), together with Proposition
3, enable us to deduce that (32) has a unique rank-one solution. In the same spirit as the proof of
Corollary 1, the unique rank-one solution characteristic of (32) further implies that γ⋆(P ) = γ⋆relax(P )
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(recall Lemma 1), and that the solution of (32) has to be the solution of (31), and vice versa. 
The relaxed (actually, equivalent) R-SRM problem (32) can be transformed to an SDP. By employing
the Charnes-Cooper transformation and S-procedure, and by some careful manipulations, we show that
Proposition 4 Problem (32) is equivalent to the following SDP
min
Z,ξ,τ,λb,λe
τ (34a)
s.t. Mb(Z, λb, ξ)  0, (34b)
Me,k(Z, λe,k, ξ, τ)  0, k = 1, . . . ,K, (34c)
Tr(Z) ≤ ξP, (34d)
Z  0, ξ ≥ 0, λb ≥ 0, λe,k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K, (34e)
where λe = [ λe,1, . . . , λe,K ]T ,
Mb(Z, λb, ξ) ,

λbINt + Z Zh¯
h¯HZ h¯HZh¯+ ξ − λbε2b − 1

 ,
Me,k(Z, λe,k, ξ, τ) ,

λe,kINe,kNt −Zk −Zkg¯k
−g¯Hk Zk −λe,kε2e,k − ξ + τ − g¯Hk Zkg¯k

 ,
and Zk = INe,k⊗Z. Specifically, Problems (32) and (34) are equivalent through the relation W = Z/ξ.
We delegate the proof of Proposition 4 to Appendix D, since the key ideas behind the proof, the
Charnes-Cooper transformation and S-procedure, have been demonstrated in the preceding development.
In summary, we have shown that the nonconvex R-SRM problem (31) can be equivalently solved by
solving the convex SDP (34); see Theorem 2 and Proposition 4.
Recall that in the perfect CSI scenario studied in the previous section, transmit beamforming is shown
to be the optimal transmit strategy for the SRC and SRM designs in general. This physical result remains
valid for the worst-case robust SRC and SRM designs, as indicated in Corollary 2 and Theorem 2.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We provide simulation results to illustrate the secrecy-rate performance gains of the proposed SDP
solutions compared to some other existing methods. We will first consider the perfect CSI case in the
first subsection, and then the imperfect CSI case in the second subsection.
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A. The Perfect CSI Case
The results to be presented in this subsection are based on the following simulation settings, unless
specified: At Alice, the number of transmit antennas is Nt = 10, and the average transmit power limit
is P = 3 dB. Three Eves are present (K = 3), and their numbers of receive antennas are Ne,1 = . . . =
Ne,K = 3. Perfect CSIs are assumed. At each trial of the simulations, Bob’s channel h is randomly
generated following an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and unit variance. Similarly, each Eve’s channel Gk is randomly generated following an i.i.d.
complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance ρ2e . We fix ρ2e = 1, if not mentioned. The
simulation results were obtained based on an average of 1000 independent trials.
The following transmit designs are tested in our simulations: the proposed SDP solution (16) to solving
the SRM problem (5), the projected-MRT method described in Section II-B, and a simple method called
plain-MRT here. In plain-MRT we choose Bob’s channel direction, h/‖h‖, as the transmit weight.
Specifically, plain-MRT sets W = (P/‖h‖2)hhH if the corresponding secrecy rate is positive; and
W = 0 otherwise. Plain-MRT is a suboptimal, arguably weak, method since it ignores the presence of
Eves. It is nonetheless interesting to examine its secrecy-rate performance relative to SDP.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rates of the various methods versus (a) the number of Eves, and (b) the average channel strength of Eves.
1) Secrecy rates versus the number of Eves: Fig. 2(a) shows the secrecy rate behaviors of the various
methods when we increase the number of Eves K. We can see that the proposed SDP method yields
better performance than the two other methods over the whole range of K tested. The secrecy rate of
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projected-MRT is able to approach that of SDP for K ≤ 2, but becomes zero for K > 3; the latter case is
when the degree of freedom of all Eves combined,
∑K
k=1Ne,k = 3K, is higher than the transmit degree
of freedom. By contrast, the SDP method is able to provide a secrecy rate of higher than 1.5bps/Hz even
with K = 10.
2) Secrecy rates versus Eves’ received signal strength: We investigate the impact of ‘near-far’ effects
on the secrecy rate behaviors; i.e., how the various methods perform when Eves’ received signal strength,
characterized by ρ2e , changes. Fig. 2(b) shows the secrecy rates of the various methods with respect to
ρ2e. Note that ρe > 1 means that every Eve has a stronger received signal strength than Bob, while
ρe < 1 means the vice versa. The following two phenomenons are observed for the MRT methods: First,
plain-MRT approaches SDP for small ρ2e, which makes sense since one may simply ignore weak Eves
in the transmit design. Second, projected-MRT has its secrecy rate invariant to ρ2e , which is due to its
nulling process. This means that projected-MRT can cope with strong Eves rather effectively. Fig. 2(b)
also illustrates that the proposed SDP methods provide better performance than the two MRT methods,
especially for ρ2e ≥ 0.5.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus transmit power.
3) Secrecy rates versus the transmit power: We are interested in evaluating the secrecy rate perfor-
mance of the various methods with respect to the transmit power budget P . The results are displayed in
Fig. 3. Interestingly, we see that the secrecy rate of SDP appears to be approached by that of plain-MRT
for small P , and by that of projected-MRT for large P .
April 19, 2011 DRAFT
20
B. The Imperfect CSI Case
The simulation settings in the imperfect CSI case are generally identical to those of the perfect CSI
case above, except that the average power limit is increased to P = 20dB. Regarding the imperfect CSI
effects, we define the following channel uncertainty ratios:
αe,k =
εe,k√
E{‖G¯k‖2F }
, k = 1, . . . ,K
αb =
εb√
E{‖h¯‖2}
,
and use them to control the amount of channel uncertainties in the simulations. We fix αe,1 = . . . =
αe,K , αe. We will choose αb = 0.03, αe = 0.1, unless specified. The performance measure is the
worst-case secrecy rate defined in (17)-(21). This performance measure does not have a closed form, but
can be computed via SDP; the details are described in Appendix E.
We evaluate the performance of the robust SDP method developed in Section IV-C, the non-robust SDP
method (in Section III-B), projected-MRT, and plain-MRT. The latter three methods use the presumed
CSIs h¯, G¯1, . . . , G¯K to perform transmit designs in the simulations, and then we evaluate the resultant
worst-case secrecy rates.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate performance with imperfect CSI. (a) Worst-case secrecy rate versus Eves’ channel uncertainty ratio; (b)
Probability of non-negative worst-case secrecy rate versus Eves’ channel uncertainty ratio.
1) Secrecy rate performance versus Eve’s channel uncertainty ratio: Fig. 4(a) presents the worst-case
secrecy rates of the various methods versus Eve’s channel uncertainty ratio αe. As seen in the figure, the
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robust SDP method yields the best worst-case secrecy rate among all the methods, especially when αe is
large. Moreover, we observe a peculiar behavior— that non-robust SDP, projected-MRT, and plain-MRT
yield negative worst-case secrecy rates for αe > 0.18. That is because these perfect-CSI-based methods
aim to provide non-negative secrecy rate results for the presumed CSIs, but not for the actual CSIs. To
get a better idea of how sensitive the non-robust methods can be in the presence of imperfect CSIs, in
Fig. 4(b) we show the probability of non-negative secrecy rate; i.e., the chance that a method gives non-
negative worst-case secrecy rate under the 1000 independent trials. One can see that the robust method
always guarantees a non-negative secrecy rate (which is expected from its design formulation), and that
the non-robust methods violate non-negative secrecy rate quite seriously especially for large αe.
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate performance with imperfect CSI. (a) Worst-case secrecy rate versus transmit power; (b) Worst-case secrecy
rate versus Eves’ received signal strength.
2) Worst-case secrecy rates versus transmit power, and Eves’ received signal strength: More results are
shown to demonstrate the robustness of the proposed robust SDP method. Fig. 5(a) plots the worst-case
secrecy rates of the various methods against the transmit power P . As seen, the worst-case secrecy rate
performance of the robust SDP method is better than those of the other methods. Moreover, we observe
that for non-robust SDP and projected-MRT, keeping on increasing P ends up decreasing the worst-case
secrecy rate. That is because increasing the power may also help improve eavesdroppers’ receptions,
if the transmit design does not take channel uncertainties into account. Fig. 5(b) plots the worst-case
secrecy rates against ρ2e. Again, the robust SDP method is seen to yield better worst-case secrecy rates
than the other methods.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
To conclude, this paper has addressed the transmit covariance design problem of MISO secrecy-rate
maximization in the presence of multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers, using an effective SDP approach.
Both perfect and imperfect CSI cases are considered in our designs. We have shown by analysis that
transmit beamforming is generally the secrecy-rate optimal strategy for the considered scenarios. As
illustrated by the simulations, the proposed SDP solutions outperform some other existing methods.
It is worthwhile to mention some possible extensions of this work. In [42], we have illustrated that
the same SDP approach can essentially be used to solve MISO SRM with more complex covariance
constraints, such as per-antenna power constraints, and interference temperature constraints arising from
CR. In [43], we have considered a multicast extension; i.e., multiple Bobs receiving the same information.
There, our SDP approach is provably optimal only for some special cases such as the 1 Eve, 2-to-3 Bobs
setting; it serves as a tractable approximation otherwise. Despite this, the SDP approach was empirically
shown to provide good lower and upper bounds for the multicast secrecy rate.
Before closing this paper, we should highlight that some concurrent research studies, e.g., [12], [14],
[18], [23], have demonstrated that adding artificial noise (AN) in the transmit design is quite effective
in degrading Eves’ receptions. Hence, a meaningful future direction would be to extend this work to
the AN-aided case, optimizing the transmit design and AN jointly for the maximum secrecy rate. The
resultant design optimization is expected to be more difficult than those tackled here, and it would be
interesting to see how the proposed SDP approach may be used to help overcome the arising design
challenges. Moreover, while this paper has its theme on optimal SRM designs, a parallel direction that is
also meaningful is to further investigate simple suboptimal SRM designs and their aspects. For example,
one intuitive design is to treat all the Eves as one “super-Eve”, and then employ the one-Eve optimal
design (3) which has a closed form. Owing to page limit, such a possibility is not considered in this
paper, but would be another interesting future direction.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
For Problem (11), let us first write out its Lagrangian function:
L(W,Y,µ) = Tr(W)− Tr(WY) +
K∑
k=1
µk
(
2R(1 + Tr(GkG
H
k W)) − Tr(hhHW)− 1
)
,
where µ = [ µ1, . . . , µK ]T , µ1, . . . , µK ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian dual variable for the minimum
secrecy-rate constraints, and Y ∈ HNt+ is the Lagrangian dual variables for the constraint W  0.
The corresponding KKT conditions are shown to be
Y = I+ 2R
∑K
k=1 µkGkG
H
k − (
∑K
k=1 µk)hh
H , (35a)
YW = 0, (35b)
1 + Tr(hhHW) ≥ 2R(1 + Tr(GkGHk W)), ∀k (35c)
W  0, Y  0, µk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K. (35d)
Note that in general, problem (11) satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification condition: If problem (11)
has a feasible point, then one can prove, by construction, that there exists a strictly feasible point for
problem (11). As a result, strong duality holds and the KKT conditions are the necessary conditions for
a primal-dual point
(
W,Y,µ
)
to be optimal.
The key to showing the rank-one structure of W lies in (35a). Let
B = I+ 2R
∑K
k=1 µkGkG
H
k .
We see that B is positive definite, and thus has full rank. By letting ρ =
∑K
k=1 µk ≥ 0 and by denoting
B1/2 as a positive definite square root of B, we have that
rank(Y) ≡ rank(B−1/2YB−1/2)
= rank(I− ρ(B−1/2h)(B−1/2h)H) ≥ Nt − 1,
i.e., rank(Y) is either Nt or Nt−1. For rank(Y) = Nt, (35b) can only be satisfied by W = 0. However,
W = 0 violates (35c) when R > 0. For rank(Y) = Nt − 1, (35b) is achieved only when W lies in the
nullspace of Y, the dimension of which is one. This means that any optimal W must be of rank one.
The proof above has shown that any primal optimal solution W of (11) must be of rank one for
R > 0. Next, we consider the uniqueness of the optimal W. Suppose that there are two distinct optimal
solutions, say W1 and W2, which satisfy rank(W1) = rank(W2) = 1. It can be easily shown that
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the subspaces spanned by W1 and W2 must be different in order for W1 and W2 to be distinct; i.e.,
R(W1) 6= R(W2) where R(·) denotes the range space of the argument. As a basic result in convex
optimization, any W3 = βW1 + (1− β)W2, for β ∈ (0, 1), is also an optimal solution [35]. Since W1
and W2 are distinct, it can be easily shown that W3 is of rank two, which violates the necessity that
any optimal W must be of rank one. In other words, we must have one optimal W only.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
For ease of exposition, we restate Problems (13) and (14) in the following equations, respectively
γ⋆relax = min
W0
φ(W)
s.t. Tr(W) ≤ P
(36)
and
min
W0
Tr(W)
s.t. γ⋆relax ≥ φ(W)
(37)
where, with a slight abuse of notations but for notational simplicity, γ⋆relax(P ) is replaced by γ⋆relax, and
φ(W) = max
k=1,...,K
1 + Tr(GHk WGk)
1 + hHWh
is used to denote the objective function of (36).
Our proof is divided into three steps: First, we prove that an optimal solution to Problem (37) is also
an optimal solution to Problem (36); second, we prove the converse; finally, we utilize Proposition 1 to
establish our claim in Theorem 1.
Step 1: Let W¯ be an optimal solution of (36), and Wˆ be an optimal solution of (37). By noting that
W¯ is also feasible to (37), we have that
P ≥ Tr(W¯) ≥ Tr(Wˆ).
Hence, Wˆ is also feasible to (36). This further implies that φ(Wˆ) ≥ γ⋆relax. Moreover, as an optimal
solution of (37), Wˆ must satisfy the constraint in (37); i.e., γ⋆relax ≥ φ(Wˆ). We therefore have φ(Wˆ) =
γ⋆relax; in other words, Wˆ is optimal to (36).
Step 2: Suppose that W¯ is optimal to Problem (36), but not optimal to (37). Since W¯ is feasible
to (37), the following relation holds
Tr(Wˆ) < Tr(W¯) ≤ P.
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Since Tr(Wˆ) < P , we can construct another point W˘ = α0Wˆ with α0 > 1, such that Tr(W˘) = P ;
i.e., W˘ is feasible to Problem (36). Now, consider the following function
f(α) := φ(αWˆ) =
1 + α max
k=1,...,K
Tr(GHk WˆGk)
1 + αhHWˆh
.
The function f(α) is strictly decreasing with respect to α: It can be verified that
f ′(α) =
max
k=1,...,K
Tr(GHk WˆGk)− hHWˆh
(1 + αhHWˆh)2
< 0,
where the inequality above holds for hHWˆh > max
k=1,...,K
Tr(GHk WˆGk), which must be true for γ⋆relax ≤
γ⋆ < 1. With the strictly decreasing property of f(α) and α0 > 1, we have that
φ(W˘) = φ(α0Wˆ) = f(α0) < f(1) = φ(Wˆ) = γ
⋆
relax
which means that W˘ can achieve a lower objective value than Wˆ in Problem (36). This contradicts the
optimality of Wˆ for Problem (36).
Step 3: So far, we have proven that Problems (36) and (37) have the same optimal solution set. Since
γ⋆relax < 1, by Proposition 1, we know that there is a unique rank-one optimal solution to Problem (37).
Hence Problem (36) also admits a unique rank-one optimal solution. Moreover, this rank-one optimal
solution fulfills the equality γ⋆ = γ⋆relax (recall Lemma 1), thereby serving as an optimal solution to the
original problem (12) as well. On the other hand, let W⋆ be an optimal solution of (12). Since W⋆ is
feasible to Problem (36) and the relaxation is tight, i.e., γ⋆ = γ⋆relax, W⋆ is optimal to Problem (36),
too. This further implies that W⋆ has to be unique and of rank one.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
The key to the proof lies in the KKT conditions. The Lagrangian function of Problem (30) is given
by
L(X ) = Tr(W)−
K∑
k=1
Tr
(
Te,k(W, λe,k, θ)Ae,k
)
−Tr(Tb(W, λb, θ)Ab
)−Tr(WS)− λbµb −
K∑
k=1
λe,kµe,k (38)
where X =
{
W,S, λb,λe, θ, µb,µe,Ae,Ab
}
collects all the primal and dual variables, with λe =
[ λe,1, . . . , λe,K ]
T
, µe = [ µe,1, . . . , µe,K ]
T
, and Ae = {Ae,k}Kk=1; Ae,k ∈ HNe,kNt+1+ ,Ab ∈ HNt+1+ ,S ∈
H
Nt
+ , µb ∈ R+ and µe,k ∈ R+ are dual variables associated with Te,k, Tb, W, λb and λe,k, respectively.
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For ease of expression, we rewrite Tb(W, λb, θ) and Te,k(W, λe,k, θ) as
Tb(W, λb, θ) = Γb(λb, θ) +V
H
b WVb, (39)
Te,k(W, λe,k, θ) = Γe,k(λe,k, θ)−VHe,kWkVe,k, (40)
where
Γb(λb, θ) =

λbINt 0
0 −λbε2b − θ + 1

 , Vb = [ INt h¯ ],
Γe,k(λe,k, θ) =

λe,kINtNe,k 0
0 −λe,kε2e,k + 2−Rθ − 1

 , Ve,k = [ INtNe,k g¯k ].
Substituting (39) and (40) into (38), we obtain an alternate expression of the Lagrangian function
L(X ) = Tr(W) +
K∑
k=1
Tr
(
WkVe,kAe,kV
H
e,k
)− Tr(WVbAbVHb
)
−Tr(WS) + ϕ(λb,λe, θ, µb,µe,Ae,Ab
)
,
= Tr(W) +
K∑
k=1
Ne,k∑
l=1
Tr
(
WB
(l,l)
e,k
)− Tr(WVbAbVHb
)
−Tr(WS) + ϕ(λb,λe, θ, µb,µe,Ae,Ab
)
, (41)
where B(l,l)e,k ∈ HNt+ is a block submatrix of Ve,kAe,kVHe,k; specifically,
Ve,kAe,kV
H
e,k =


B
(1,1)
e,k . . . B
(1,Ne,k)
e,k
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
B
(Ne,k,1)
e,k . . . B
(Ne,k ,Ne,k)
e,k

 ∈ H
NtNe,k
+ ;
and ϕ
(
λb,λe, θ, µb,µe,Ae,Ab
)
collects the terms not related to W and S, which are not important to
the proof.
We consider only the KKT conditions relevant to the proof here:
∇WL(X ) = 0, (42a)
Tb(W, λb, θ)Ab = 0, (42b)
WS = 0, (42c)
λb ≥ 0, W  0, Ab  0, Ae,k  0, k = 1, . . . ,K. (42d)
Using the expression (41), the KKT condition (42a) is obtained as follows:
INt +
K∑
k=1
Ne,k∑
l=1
B
(l,l)
e,k −VbAbVHb − S = 0. (43)
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Premultiplying the two sides of (43) by W, and making use of (42c), we get
W
(
INt +
K∑
k=1
Ne,k∑
l=1
B
(l,l)
e,k
)
=WVbAbV
H
b . (44)
Now the following relation holds:
rank(W) = rank

W
(
INt +
K∑
k=1
Ne,k∑
l=1
B
(l,l)
e,k
) (45a)
= rank(WVbAbV
H
b ) (45b)
≤ min{rank(VbAbVHb ), rank(W)} (45c)
where (45a) is due to INt +
∑K
k=1
∑Ne,k
l=1 B
(l,l)
e,k ≻ 0, (45b) and (45c) follow from (44) and a basic rank
inequality property [41]. If we can prove that rank(VbAbVHb ) = 1, then, from (45), we will obtain
rank(W) ≤ 1. Therefore, in the remaining part of the proof, we will focus on the rank of VbAbVHb .
Substituting (39) into the KKT condition (42b), we obtain
Γb(λb, θ)Ab +V
H
b WVbAb = 0. (46)
And it follows by postmultiplying (46) by VHb that
Γb(λb, θ)AbV
H
b +V
H
b WVbAbV
H
b = 0. (47)
By noting the following facts
[ INt 0 ]Γb(λb, θ) = λb[ INt 0 ] = λb(Vb − [ 0Nt h¯ ]),
[ INt 0 ]V
H
b = INt , (48)
we premultiply the both sides of (47) by [ INt 0 ] to get
λb(Vb − [ 0Nt h¯ ])AbVHb +WVbAbVHb = 0, (49a)
⇔ (λbINt +W)VbAbVHb = λb[ 0Nt h¯ ]AbVHb . (49b)
We claim that λb must be positive. Suppose that λb = 0. Then, according to (49a), we haveWVbAbVHb =
0. By (44) and INt +
∑K
k=1
∑Ne,k
l=1 B
(l,l)
e,k ≻ 0, we have W = 0. However, W = 0 is infeasible to the
relaxed R-SRC problem (24), whenever R > 0. Therefore, λb > 0 must hold. With λb > 0, we have that
rank(VbAbV
H
b ) = rank
(
(λbINt +W)VbAbV
H
b
) (50a)
= rank
(
λb[ 0Nt h¯ ]AbV
H
b
) (50b)
≤ rank([ 0Nt h¯ ]
) ≤ 1, (50c)
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where (50a) is due to λbINt +W ≻ 0, (50b) and (50c) follow from (49b) and a basic rank inequality
property [41].
Combining (45) and (50), we have
rank(W) ≤ rank(VbAbVHb ) ≤ 1.
Since W 6= 0 for R > 0, the rank of W must be one.
Regarding the uniqueness of the optimal solution, the proof is exactly the same as that in Proposition 1.
We therefore omit it for brevity.
D. Proof of Proposition 4
By the change of variable W = Z/ξ, ξ > 0, Problem (32) can be transformed to
min
Z,ξ
ξ + max
k=1,...,K
max
Gk∈Be,k
Tr(GHk ZGk)
ξ + min
h∈Bb
hHZh
(51a)
s.t. Tr(Z) ≤ ξP, (51b)
Z  0, ξ > 0. (51c)
We first show that (51) is equivalent to the following problem
min
Z,ξ
ξ + max
k=1,...,K
max
Gk∈Be,k
Tr(GHk ZGk) (52a)
s.t. ξ + min
h∈Bb
hHZh ≥ 1, (52b)
Tr(Z) ≤ ξP, (52c)
Z  0, ξ ≥ 0. (52d)
Consider the optimal solution of (52), say, denoted by (Z⋆, ξ⋆). From (52b) and (52c), it can be verified
that ξ⋆ > 0 must hold. Hence, (Z⋆, ξ⋆) is feasible to (51). One can deduce that (Z⋆, ξ⋆) is optimal to (51)
if it holds true that
ξ⋆ + min
h∈Bb
hHZ⋆h = 1.
We use contradiction to verify the latter. Suppose that ξ⋆ +minh∈Bb hHZ⋆h > 1. Then we can choose
a feasible point (Z˜, ξ˜) = (αZ⋆, αξ⋆) for some 0 < α < 1 such that ξ˜ +minh∈Bb hHZ˜h = 1. The point
(Z˜, ξ˜) can be verified to achieve an objective value lower than that offered by the optimal point (Z⋆, ξ⋆),
which is a contradiction.
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Our next step is to turn (52) to an SDP. Using the epigraph reformulation, (52) can be rewritten as
min
Z,ξ,τ
τ (53a)
s.t. τ ≥ ξ + max
Gk∈Be,k
Tr(GHk ZGk), k = 1, . . . ,K, (53b)
ξ + min
h∈Bb
hHZh ≥ 1, (53c)
Tr(Z) ≤ ξP, (53d)
Z  0, ξ ≥ 0. (53e)
By applying the S-procedure to convert the constraints (53b) and (53c) into LMIs, we obtain the SDP (34).
E. Worst-case Secrecy Rate Calculation
The worst-case secrecy rate function ψ(W) in (18)-(21) can be computed when W is of rank one
(which is the case of all the considered methods in this paper). With rank-one W, ψ(W) can be reduced
to
ψ(W) = min
h∈Bb
log(1 + hHWh)− max
k=1,...,K
max
Gk∈Be,k
log(1 + Tr(GHk WGk)). (54)
The first and second terms of (54) are separate optimization problems. They can be recast as the following
two SDPs by using the S-procedure:
τ⋆1 = max
τ1,λb
τ1
s.t.

λbINt +W Wh¯
h¯HW h¯HWh¯+ 1− τ1 − λbε2b

  0,
λb ≥ 0,
and
τ⋆2 = min
τ2,λe,1,...,λe,K
τ2
s.t.

λe,kINe,kNt −Wk −Wkg¯k
−g¯Hk Wk −λe,kε2e,k − g¯Hk Wkg¯k + τ2 − 1

  0,
λe,k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K,
where Wk = INe,k⊗W. Once the optimal values τ⋆1 and τ⋆2 are computed (by an available SDP solver),
the worst-case secrecy rate is obtained as
ψ(W) = log(τ⋆1 )− log(τ⋆2 ).
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